Developments in computational linguistics lead to the conception of sense extension rules in the lexicon as a theory of regular polysemy. Lexical rules are defined only on such semantic information as is in the lexicon with the desired effect of restricting the amount of semantic information in the lexical representation of ambiguous items. The paper presents some examples which indicate difficulties for this approach, argues for pragmatically based rules which use conceptual information, and proposes a programmatic partial formalization of this approach in the framework of abductive interpretation.
AN INFORMAL DESCRIPTION OF SENSE EXTENSION
It suffices intuitively to characterize sense extension as one kind of regularity in the interpretation of polysemous words. Rules are usually invoked to describe regularities. The discussion of sense extension rules within a formal framework began somewhere in the 1960s. McCawley (1968) , discussing the semantics of lexical items in the lexicon, suggested that probably all languages have implicational relationships among their lexical items, whereby the existence of one lexical item implies the existence of another lexical item, which then need not be listed in the lexicon.
His example of such an implicational relation is the use of words for temperature ranges (warm, cool) to also represent the temperature sensation produced by wearing an article of clothing. To quote McCawley again ... the English sentence
(1) This coat is warm.
is ambiguous between the meaning that the coat has a relatively high temperature and the meaning that it makes the wearer feel warm ... I propose then that English has two lexical items warm, of which only one appears in the lexicon, the other being predictable on the basis of a principle that for each lexical item which is an adjective denoting a temperature range there is a lexical item identical to it save for the fact that it is restricted to articles of clothing and means 'producing the sensation corresponding to the temperature range denoted by the original adjective'.
Note that although a rule is a mapping between lexical entries in the lexicon, nothing is said about the nature of the semantic information in the entries. At a second glance the generalization is not quite correct, and McCawley himself notes this in the postscript to the paper reprinted in McCawley (1973) . In (2) the restriction to clothing is violated.
(2) The fire is warm.
On the other hand, in the case of articles of clothing other bodily sensations can seemingly be predicated of them, e.g. in (3).
(3) The sweater is itchy.
The domain of the rule could probably be broader than originally suggested, but to find this out a more subtle analysis is required, which was never conducted. Later Green (1974) in her critique of the implicational rule approach noted that the domain of the rule suggested by McCawley should probably be more restricted at the same time because the words hot and cold are not used to refer to articles of clothing producing these sensations, i.e. we do not usually say This jacket is cold.
The question how to delimit the domain of a rule is evidently not trivial. As an additional touch one might note with Green that it is not clear why only cool, hot, and warm have extensions to colours, as in hot colours, warm colours, and only warm, cool, and cold may refer to personality characteristics. To quote Green: we say that someone has a warm personality, and that he is warm to the people, but not that he has a hot personality, or that he is hot to the people.
Confronted with these irregularities, Green thinks that the implicational rule approach to the lexicon is too strong, but that (to quote Green again):
it would be possible to think of rules that imply the possibility of specific kinds of'derived' uses (implicational possibility rules) as defining the notion of 'related lexical entry'. These would bind together as one lexical item lexical entries which have semantic relationships related by these rules. This way, the non-existence of a usage would not have to be seen as an exception to the rule, which has to be learned in addition to the rule. Rather, it may be seen simply as the existence of a gap in the lexicon; if a word or usage should be added to the lexicon to fill that gap, it would be seen as an addition to the lexicon, not as a change in a rule of grammar.
Her statement can be interpreted as indicating a different conception of rules. Here the rules are not mappings between lexical entries, but are used on demand to fix all possible semantic interpretations of a lexical item, where evidently an item is something different from McCawley's item, for which entry is used.
The rules as conceived by Green would probably leave it to the speaker to decide on some regular basis whether there should be two related lexical entries in a lexical item, i.e. whether a rule should be applied. The question arises whether the basis is sufficiently determined by the lexicon data or needs some knowledge from outside the lexicon. In the latter case the rule can be said to use conceptual knowledge. If pragmatics is conceived as an interface between purely linguistic and general conceptual knowledge, the rules suggested by Green may be taken to belong to pragmatics.
Though the example of McCawley would not probably be considered to be the case of a sense extension rule now, the idea caught on. The line of thought leading to the pragmatic understanding of the kind of regularities under the above interpretation of Green's quotation is also elaborated in Nunberg (1979 Nunberg ( , 1995 . The line of thought based on the suggestion of McCawley is most prominently expounded in , Briscoe, Copestake, & Lascarides (1995) . To isolate what I consider to be the essential difference between them consider the basic problem to be solved in the conceptual analysis of the phenomenon.
To provide a model of sense extension it is necessary to find sufficiently general rule domain definitions and to account for the existence of exceptions in the domains. To define a domain the source class of objects should be defined as well as the basic transfer relation between that class and the class resulting from the rule application. It sometimes seems that exceptions are an artefact of an imprecise domain description. The two conceptions differ in their predictions as to whether the domain description can be made precise. The pragmatic understanding would imply that this is a matter of conceptual knowledge, dependent on many totally nonlinguistic factors and complex conceptual processes, hence difficult. The lexicalist semantic understanding would imply that lexical entries contain only a limited amount of regimented semantic information; hence the domains and transfer relations can be more easily described in terms of the scheme of a lexical entry. This position seems to be more attractive, provided we know how to make the abstract relations of the scheme more specific. But we do not expect a high degree of precision.
In his pragmatic approach Nunberg assumes that a speaker of some particular language like English has at her disposal a set of basic senseshifting transfer functions reflecting principles of the organisation of conceptual knowledge (rather like the rules of Green). They can be combined in different ways to give rule-like sense extensions. Nunberg (1995) and Nunberg & Zaenen (1992) are cautious regarding their relation to the lexicon. There it is maintained that some of the processes could be viewed as lexical. In such cases of lexical transfer the conceptual relation defining the transfer function is explicitly coded in the relevant lexical entries, so the transfer is licensed on the information in the lexical entry. This accounts for the language-specific character of sense extension. In other cases conceptual information is needed that is not represented in the lexicon. The only hope to set some limit on the amount of such information is to claim that it should be in some sense relevant for the speaker. Nunberg (1995) uses the notions of salience and noteworthiness. The transfer function should be salient, and the property contributed by the new predicate should be noteworthy in the context. Briscoe et al. (1995) assume that the rules are present in the lexicon and have the status of defaults. That means they should be applied whenever their application is allowed. Predicted, but unattested cases have to do either with the involved default being overridden or with its graded quality. The rule domains are more easily specifiable because lexical entries contain only a few types of semantic relations which define their qualia structure (Pustejovsky 1995), i.e. some essential properties of the corresponding objects. The relations can be made conceptually more precise, but this additional information is not accessible to the rules.
A number of examples should now help to bring the difference between the two conceptions into focus.
One lexical predicate transfer in English can be described by 'if an animal has hide such that it is common to process it to be used by people in the English linguistic community, then the word denoting this animal can be used to denote the processed hide'. Another regularity is to use an animal's name for the meat of this animal, cf. (4).
(4) a. We had rabbit for dinner yesterday b. She wears rabbit It could seem that the sense extensions which let words denoting animals denote their edible substance or their hide cover indeed only the animals the indicated parts of which are regularly used in the indicated way in English-speaking communities. The restrictions to the community and to regular use o the parts/products in the community seems necessary because names of animals which do not answer the descriptions do not allow the sense extension to proceed quite as easily, cf. an example of in (5).
(5) Badger hams are a delicacy in China while mole is eaten in many parts of Africa
Under the pragmatic account we might base the transfer on our factual knowledge about the use of fur or meat of specific animals, then generalize it if this use is sufficiently important, to obtain a sense extension rule which takes an animal to some related stuff. The ease of transfer in the core set of cases could then be accounted for if the necessary relations were coded in the lexical entries for words like rabbit. In cases like (5) we would need more general inferences via the conceptual knowledge. For moles we could then assume that they are used for food. This description is compatible with Nunberg's treatment Treating sense extensions as lexical rules, another explanation of (5) should be sought, because factual knowledge is not available in the lexicon. formulate the rule in terms of an abstract qualia relation origin, and its domain description refers to animals. The rule generates a lexical entry for the comestible substance for any word denoting an animal. The actual attested use of the rule by English speakers to derive the meat sense of mole determines the acceptability degree judgement for (5). Since mole is not used in the corresponding way in the English community, the applications of the rule are thus very rare. This statistics of the rule is registered as the relative frequency of the derived sense in the lexical entry for mole Briscoe & Copestake 1996) . Using rules to derive senses with low frequency leads to the deterioration of their acceptability compared to regular cases. The sense-extension from animals to their meat is barred from its usual application to the name of an animal by the existence of a word which is reserved to denote the edible parts of this animal specifically. Thus pork is the usual name of pig meat, and not pig. This part of the phenomenon is known as blocking. An important characteristic of blocking is deblocking. Deblocking happens when the name with the blocked reading is nevertheless sometimes used in this reading instead of the specialized word to denote the entity in question. The examples are of mixed quality, but could make the point, cf. (6, 7), both from , the latter coming from Terry Pratchett's Guards, Guards where the use of the blocked version characterizes one character of the novel, called Throat, because of the pejorative associations with the use of the word pig.
(6) Sam ate "pig (instead of pork) (7) 'Hot sausages, two for a dollar, made of genuine pig, why not buy one for the lady?' 'Don't you mean pork sir?' said Carrot warily, eyeing the glistening tubes. 'Manner of speaking, manner of speaking,' said Throat quickly. 'Certainly your actual pig products. Genuine pig.'
A pragmatic explanation would appeal to conversational principles. 1 Briscoe et al. (1995) develop a theory of default interaction to account for blocking and intend to treat deblocking as blocking by a lexical exception, in principle. This account does not easily generalize to the sense extension rules, and is supplanted by one based on a statistical explication of Gricean maxims in later papers. This one leaves deblocking to pragmatics.
The discussion of sense extension in Nunberg (1979 ), in Ruhl (1989 , and in is based mostly on English examples. Some comparison with other languages could throw additional light on the sense extension rules and, I believe, would indicate some difficulties for the lexicon conception of the rules.
In Russian the meat of a mammal denoted by a noun is usually referred to by a morphologically regularly related mass term derived from the noun via the suffix -ina. The suffix is of very general application, but sometimes the derivation is blocked, e.g. korova (cow) in this sense is blocked in favour of the word gov'ad-ina. Although the word contains the suffix, the stem is not the name of any animal. Now, if you wanted to convey the idea that the edible parts of a mammal were consumed as a whole, and not in portions, you could use the sense extension device like in English. And it is the only way to use the animal names for mammals in this extended sense, since the uses which call the holistic consumption into question have a very strange ring to them, e.g. (8). (8) For names of bigger fowl the derivatives often exist, but the difference in the meaning between the morphologically derived forms and the forms in the extended sense is barely perceptible. The derivation does not apply to smaller hunted birds like snipe, or to the word ptica (fowl), and sense extension rules function here like in the case of fish. On the assumption that derivation is a lexical rule the interaction of the two rules is difficult to state. The necessary domain definitions seem also to be very difficult in the lexicon. There does not seem to be a problem of principle for the pragmatic account, since the applicability of the transfer function can be derived on any cultural basis whatsoever. At a first approximation, the dichotomy could run along the lines of how much edible substances is obtained from the animal or whether or not it is eaten as a whole as a rule, leaving ptica (fowl) out for obvious reasons. The generalization can provide estimates for a nonce word or an unknown name of an animal. The probabilistic solution in the lexicon is completely non-predictive in these cases.
2 Apresjan (1973) is a compendium of sense extension rules in Russian. It includes, among other regularities, the following two: the sense extension rule from fruit to plants bearing these fruit, 3 in case the fruit is used for food (10), and from plants to a kind of food product made from them, as in (10) a. abrikos vs. abrikos apricot b. jablon'a vs. jabloko applletree vs. apple (11) gorcica, xren mustard, horseradish
The first makes an exception for apples (10b) and does not easily apply to exotic fruit in Russian. Thus, it is very strange to say There stood a banana/ mango I coconut/orange at the corner to refer to the corresponding plants. The second applies only to plants which can reach the kitchen table grouped up, so that the form identifying the plant is not preserved. A third regularity, not listed in Apresjan's work, but very common, is to refer to spots made by the juice of some berries with the name of the berry, e.g. in (12).
(12) U teb'a klubnika na shtanax ne otstiralas' At you strawberry on trousers not washed-away-reflexive The strawberry juice stain on your trousers did not wash away It is unclear whether three sense extension rules in the sense of lexical mapping are adequate here. If the first one is regarded as such, either there is no origin specification in the lexical entries of exotic fruit, because there is no word blocking the application of the rule similar to (10b), or the probabilistic solution must be adopted. The absence is unnatural, the probabilistic solution simply registers the exceptions. But the upshot of this is that people who do not know the names for the plants will still use the sense extension innovatively. This does not seem to happen, they rather use things like banana tree/bush. On the pragmatic approach one explanation could simply state that the domain of the rule is limited because its results for exotic fruit are culturally not noteworthy.
The second rule would either require a very detailed specification both in lexical entries and in the rule domain of what is usually done to the plant in the domain to exclude cases of calling an apple pie an apple, or must be assimilated to some more general rule with consecutive specification of the result. Carrots cut in pieces are still called carrot, and it could be maintained that it is actually a case of a very general sense extension rule called grinding which allows the shift to the substance obtained from some object. That ground mustard is used in the kitchen only prepared in a specific way could be claimed to be world knowledge. An obvious difficulty with this treatment is the granularity of the rules and their precision. 4 We could claim that we have a lexical rule which relates syntactic features and introduces this general relation, and our world knowledge tells us how it is specified in the context, e.g. how the object is ground and what form grounding turns the thing into depending on the context? The only requirement for making the rules more precise is that of compatibility with the derived syntactic properties. The difficulty is in requirement to specify a context: mustard seeds can be ground, but not processed to be used, i.e. mixed with vinegar, etc. If we license the rule in the general form for the lexical entry mustard, we still have to qualify its result. This is a patently pragmatic option, so should we first license such general rules in the lexicon to produce excessively general lexical entries and then move them to pragmatics for qualifications?
The third rule, if considered as originating in the lexicon, presupposes such a considerable amount of world knowledge in the lexicon as to make its principled structuring by qualia relations very implausible.
However, the conception of lexical rules as defaults in the lexicon has the merit of a rigorous formalization in . The pragmatic alternative along the lines of Nunberg has some generality which can be made more precise.
The origin of the phenomenon, it might be claimed, is in the way we name things. Some names are just reserved labels, some names use relations between things, invoking the concept of one thing and shifting to a related concept, and sense extension is a way to produce this kind of shift. Before we name things, we probably decide whether the thing is worth being named at all, since the device of description is always available. This noteworthiness is a prerequisite of sense extension, cf. Nunberg (1995) . But if noteworthiness or nameworthiness (nameworthiness is probably a more suggestive term) is computed at all, its criteria are far from being clear. The nameworthiness concerns the relation underlying the regularity, and the result. It is usually motivated by the high relevance both of the processes conceptualized by the relation and of the results of these processes to some human sphere of life, and are context dependent The nameworthy relations are used by transfer functions to give an interpretation of a lexical item in a context
The central problem of the pragmatic account now is a description of transfer functions. This is also the aim of the paper. It attempts to give such a description in a general framework which views semantic interpretation as hypothetical reasoning, lexical interpretation being a part of this activity.
LEXICAL INTERPRETATION AS ABDUCTION
If lexical interpretation is hypothetical activity, lexical rules as transfer functions could be based on the reasoning mechanisms underlying this activity, too. Lexical rules determine the hypotheses space of this activity. Since a hypothesis may be adopted, but need not, such rules will be rather like the 'implicational possibility rules' of Green.
Hypothetical reasoning can be considered a case of abduction, following Peirce, e.g. Peirce (1992) . In its simplest form abduction is a mode of reasoning on the basis of a rule (which establishes a connection between a case and a result) and a possible result of the rule, to the case (possible reason for the result). The notion 'reason' is deliberately very broad and intuitively vague here, since it must be based on the formal properties of the underlying logic. The technical terms used in the literature are explanation for the reason in question and evidence or observation for the observed result of the rule. If the rule is stated as an implication, abduction is just following modus ponens backwards.
if B is observed, and A => B is given abduce A, a possible reason for B All possible reasons are called hypotheses or abducibles. The use of abduction to model interpretation of texts has already been reported by Charnjak & McDermott (1985) . Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, & Martin (1993) took it a step further. To find an interpretation of a sentence they explain its logical representation by abducing the best possible explanation for its components, where best is having the least cost. In case of the lexical interpretation they represent ambiguity by providing all possible interpretations and disambiguating the result by searching for the hypothesis which provides the cheapest explanation. Consider their example in (14) . The knowledge of the interpretation of the word bank in English is taken to consist of the postulated predicate bank(X), which is implied by two concepts corresponding to the notions of river bank, ), and of financial institution, bankf imme (X).
The antecedents may be taken as possible hypotheses, and if some discourse referent d is plugged in for the variable, we can explain the observation bank(d) in two ways by abducing to one of the readings following (13) Many non-monotonic inferences are abductive by nature, which is to say they provide plausible explanations for some states of affairs ... The problem, of course, is that not just any explanation will do; it must, in some sense, be a 'best' explanation ... But if there is a best theory, there must be poor ones; so diagnostic reasoning really consists of two problems: (a) What is the space of possible theories that account for the given evidence? (b) What are the best theories in this space?
Poole systems will be used to define the space of all interpretations of a lexical item. Under the approach of Hobbs et al. (1993) the hypothesis space is not limited, and the problem of choice is not separated from the problem of characterizing the hypothesis space.
Poole systems (Makinson 1994 introduced the term) or abductive frameworks are a formalization of hypothetical reasoning as theory formation based on first order language L. Let F be a set of sentences in L which are considered to be facts in the sense that we accept them as true and inviolate for the span of the abductive task at hand, and <f> be the sentence expressing another kind of fact, an observation which we want to explain. Finding an explanation is our abductive task. We also have a set of hypotheses II at our disposal, which we can use to explain <j>, as long as they do not lead to contradiction. For technical reasons (Poole 1987) we need a set P of ground instances of the formulas of II which would together with F imply <j>. An abductive task assumes a very simple version of theory building: if a set of ground instances P is shown not to contradict F, we simply compute the consequences of F and P together, which is a theory in the formal meaning of the word. If 4> is in the theory, we may say that P explains <f>. The sentences in P are called abducible sentences or abducibles.
To represent generalizations with potential exceptions we allow the hypotheses in II to be open first-order formulas. Free variables can be used as place holders for constants. Given all substitution instances of a hypothesis, those substitution instances which are explicitly contradicted may not be used, the others may. The rules in II are thus sentence generators.
We may now introduce the necessary terminology. An abductive framework is a pair (F, II) of sets of possibly open formulae. Let P be a set of ground instances of formulas from II.
Def. 1: A scenario of an abductive framework (F, II) is a set P of ground instances of elements of II such that F UP is consistent. Def. 2: If cj) is a sentence, an explanation of (j) from (F,II) is a scenario P of (F, Fi) which together with F implies <f>, i.e. a set P of ground instances ofTl is an explanation of (j) iff (i)pur^=4>.
(ii) P U F is consistent
It is possible to use provability, h, instead of modelling relation, f=, due to the equivalence of the notions for the first order languages.
5 A theory is explicated as an extension of the abductive framework (F,II) defined below.
Def. 3: An extension of (F, II) is the set of logical consequences of the union of F and some maximal with respect to set inclusion scenario P of (F, U).
Another name for an extension is maxiconsistent set (Makinson 1994 ). There is a connection between explainability and theory building, expressed in the following theorem proved in Poole (1988) . Theorem: there is an explanation of 0 from (F, II) iff 4> is in some extension of (F, II). The theorem says that (f> can be explained iff it follows from a consistent theory based on some maximal set of hypotheses.
Consider a simple example of an abductive task. Suppose we observe shoes-are-wet. The facts at our disposal are the implications of the data base in (15). The hypothesis set II may contain all the antecedents of the implications. It is often preferable to have only the basic hypotheses, in the sense that they are not further explainable from other hypotheses, i.e. II = {rained-last-night,sprinkler-was-on\.
We can choose either P, = {rained-last-night} or P 2 = {sprinkler-was-on} as the explanation of shoes-are-wet. The maximal scenario is their union. The extension is built on this scenario. The maximal scenario is also an explanation, but it is too presumptive. We would like to assume not all compatible cases at once, but one at a time, i.e. we should use explanations which are minimal in terms of set inclusion. We want to use knowledge in the form of hypotheses only if there is evidence for them. We do not want constantly to hypothesize that it rained last night, or that we must pay for cigarettes, but do this only if our shoes are wet or if there is a cigarette shortage and the vending machine refuses to , budge. Since neither (j> nor II are syntactically marked as observation or hypotheses, respectively, they simply are earmarked so, if they are viewed as terms in the relation of explainability. The point is they cannot be simultaneously treated as something else in the same task. And explainability is only one family of relations involved in the non-monotonic inferential activity. (1991) , i.e. they are used whenever their preconditions are met. Hypotheses are used when there is evidence for them. Formally there is no difference between the two. Moreover, whatever is a hypothesis in one abductive task might be a default in another. This conceptual difference can be taken care of by keeping defaults and hypotheses separate, so the set of defaults will be denoted by A, but defaults can be used in explanation alongside with hypotheses. The modified definition is given below. 
(i) PUDUF(=<£ (it) PUDUTUC is consistent
Note that the constraints are not used for deduction but only to reject some potential explanations.
We could compare explanations with regard to their specificity. While predicting things we might need to compare whether one default is more specific than another. A more specific default is applicable only in a subset of the cases in which the more general default is. With explanations the situation is somewhat different. We have to compare explanations as theories. A more specific explanation can explain only a subset of observations which can be explained by the more general one, if some factual conditions change. So we simply try to find one such fact which would then help us to decide which scenario to choose (Poole 1985) .
Let F be divided into those facts which we consider invariable, F n , and those which we do not, F c . Call a pair (D,g) 
solution (D,,^) is more general than solution (D 2 ,g 2 ).
The starting point of this section was the example (14) of Hobbs et al. (1993) which is repeated here as an abductive framework.
II = { bank rivtr (X), bankfi mme (X) } (16) _ J bank river (X) =• bank(X) ) bank fimnce (X) => bank(X) J
This framework models the case when there are no possibilities to further explain any of the two hypotheses, so they are basic. In this case the system of Hobbs et al. (1993) must assign assumption costs to the hypotheses because each one must be assumed. The two explanations in the Poole system should be subjected to some choice criterion, if there is one, or treated as equally plausible, if there is none. If a Poole system is embedded in a context where one of its hypotheses becomes explainable itself, this hypothesis would no longer be basic, and would not surface as a potential explanation. The system of Hobbs et al. (1993) would still consider it as a possible choice. The main difference between the systems of Poole and Hobbs is the locality of a Poole system, which is due to the fact that its hypotheses are explicitly listed. We need not consider all possible contexts from the start. And the problem of the choice criteria between the basic minimal hypotheses can be stated separately.
The general scheme of a lexical entry of an ambiguous lexical item which can be abstracted from the example from Hobbs et al. (1993) is given by the abductive framework scheme in (17).
(17) LE phfom = (r = {conSiiX) => sform(X)},U =
The simplest assumption to be made regarding the scheme is that the entities cotiSj which correspond to bank^^X) or bankf imwu (X) are names of concepts. The general entity sform(X) which corresponds to bank(X) will be called the semantic form associated with a phonological form.
CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS
It is surely impossible to do justice to the notion concept here; therefore only features which are relevant to the concerns of the paper will be introduced. It is widely accepted that at some level of abstraction a large part of conceptual knowledge can be conveniently described (as being) in propositional format. Leveque (1986) has provided a concise formulation of this assumption: 'For the structures to represent knowledge, it must be possible to interpret them propositionally, that is, as expressions in a language with a truth theory. We should be able to point to one of them and say what the world would have to be like for it to be true.' So in this respect concepts are just theories.
Abductive frameworks are a reasonably good means of modelling concepts. A substantial amount of work done by psychologists of which Barsalou (1992) is a sort of a synopsis uses frame-based formalisms as a formal implementation of the notion. But frames can be modelled by abductive frameworks, somewhat modifying the suggestions in Hayes (1980) , Reiter (1987) and Russel & Norwig (1995) as to how to interpret frames in logic. Concepts on this account contain descriptive information that people represent cognitively for a category, including definitional information, prototypical information, functionally important information, and probably other types of information as well.
For ease of reference to hypotheses they will be written involving a naming convention, i.e. where p(X) => q(X) is a hypothesis, it will be replaced by a new hypothesis consisting of a predicate with exactly those variables free which were free in the original hypothesis, say newh(X) and the set of facts will be extended by the formula newh{X) =>•
(p(X) =• q(X)) (or newh(X)kp(X) => q(X)).
Consider e.g. the concept rabbit in (18). There are two possible hypotheses here: firstly, rabbits consist of some soft matter which is edible, with an indication of which part of the rabbit this is, presumably. This hypothesis is rendered by getedible(X, Y). Secondly, rabbits have fur as their part. 7 The predicate aspof(X, Y) marks those properties which are important aspects of the concepts, structuring the theory. The remaining formulas state that rabbits are neither edible substance not parts of rabbits. Other common knowledge is listed in (19), some linguistic knowledge in (20).
Since aspects provide structure to the concepts, nameworthy things about concepts will be aspects, formally "speaking. It still remains to characterize contexts, since we want to use sense extension rules only in the context of lexical interpretation. A context is an environment in which something happens, informally speaking. The context in which the interpretation of some phonological form is computed is the context in which an abductive task of a particular kind is solved. So we heed a definition of context for an abductive task which can fulfil its role. Contexts are thus resource specifications.
Following McCarthy (1993) , contexts could be formalized as entities which may be used to index pieces of knowledge as specifying some resources in form of micro-theories. Since interpretation is hypothetical reasoning, this specification should make some distinctions. One and the same piece of knowledge can be used for different purposes in different tasks, i.e. to know a context in which this piece of knowledge is used we must know how it is used in this context, among other things, i.e. as a hypothesis, a default, a constraint, a fact, or an observation. Given that an abductive framework fixes the role of the knowledge pieces, the use of an abductive framework amounts to a partial specialization of the context parameter. Only contexts that are consistent with this role assignment can be considered for use with the framework. To be able to talk about contexts we can index the resources of an abductive framework by a context parameter which should remain the same for the task at hand. If the context is changed, a new context may contain additional resources, and the change of the context may add the resources of the new context. If the facts of the new context do not contradict those of the old context, the resulting context is consistent, though some inferences may become blocked. Another kind of context change, in which the resources of a resulting context are reclassified with regard to the resources of the old one for a new task, will not be used here. Given that a context brings an abductive framework with it, we need the notion of a composition of two consistent abductive frameworks. There is not much work going on in this direction at present, so we will only sketch the necessary operation below. The contexts will be introduced by a special predicate ct(X).
To pursue this line of thought our hypothetical rules will be specified by a context of lexical interpretation which is determined by the concept which is the primary hypothesis.
THE RULES
Cases of polysemy depend on the existence of several explanations, some of them direct, in terms of a concept, some only related to the concept. The structure of sense extension rules explored in the paper is due to the following proposal: the extended sense interpretation comes about by hypothesizing that a concept related to a given explanation by some specified relation can be taken as a new hypothesis. This meta-hypothesis is reflected by the introduction of a new predicate shift.
To analyse the structure of a rule we modify the structure of a lexical entry (17) to (21).
n = {cons t (X)} (21) { conti(X) => sform(X)
.
shift(X, Y) => sform(X)
If nothing else is specified in the context of interpretation, contj(X) is a hypothesis schema yielding explanation instances as scenarios. Any such scenario will be a minimal explanation. The predicate shift(X, Y) will allow a reference shift for a semantic form extending the hypothesis space by using the structure of conceptual knowledge. If there is an aspect of a concept that is nameworthy, this aspect can provide an interpretation of the semantic form which is normally interpreted by the concept. Note that shift (X, Y) needs an explanation from elsewhere, since there is no corresponding hypothesis in the lexical entry, shift is explained via a core lexical rule, (22). The core rule is a default, so it has to be applied whenever possible, but it is not sufficient by itself to let sfortn be deduced.
(22) A = {(ct(C)kaspof(X, Y,C))=> shift{Y,X)}
It uses a contextualized version of aspof (X, Y) , and places no constraints on possible explanation via aspof(X, Y, C). The condition ct(C) is intended to provide an appropriate binding of the context in which the rule is applied to the theory containing the resources of the concept which is the primary hypothesis in the lexical entry. To reflect the dependence of the explanation on the context we index the abductive framework itself by a context in the manner of McCarthy (1993) and use the three-place predicate aspof (X, Y, C) instead of aspof(X, Y) which reads like the relation holding of Y and X is an aspect of the concept that names X in context C. Technically we could either dispense with aspof(X, Y) and use aspof(X, Y, C), which will be done in the sequel, or (again following McCarthy 1993) decide that in the relevant context the two predicates are equivalent, and use aspof(X, Y, C) only on leaving the context. In each case the deductions will be restricted to the resources of the relevant concept. Any rule can be generated from the core rule by adding additional constraints to the abductive framework There are a number of possibilities to generate a rule from the core rule. If one and the same aspect relation is used in a number of concepts for which it is nameworthy, it can be taken itself and used to constrain the core rule. Then the domain of the rule is defined by the relation itself, regardless of whether there is a lexical entry or not for the category which forms the domain, or even whether their is a separate concept for it at all. Thus, it is possible to consider 'things that are processed for the kitchen by grinding'. The second way is to add constraints on the concepts which can be gathered in the domain, e.g. specify them as animals. It can be combined with a more general statement of the transfer relation. An the third way is to create a special category of relation which generalizes over a number of cases of sufficiently similar relations, and use this new category as a constraint. The case of animal meat and fur could be an illustration of the first or the second way, (23). The device of naming the defaults is used to make the reference to defaults in constraints easier.
C= <
To see how the rule works assume that the relevant part of the lexical entry for rabbit are as in (25).
The context is fixed to the lexical interpretation of rabbit, i.e. ct(rabbit) holds. The semantic form sfrabbit(X) of rabbit can be explained via rabbit(X), via animaltofur(Z,X, rabbit), or via animaltomeat (W, X, rabbit) . The predicates consistsoj (X, Y) and partof(X, Y) provide the necessary entailments via aspof (X, Y, rabbit) , and constrain the rules simultaneously. Consider now the examples from section 1. The case of mole can be explained, if consistsof is not nameworthy for moles, presumably because mole stuff is not considered to be edible. It can be assumed to be so. This exceptional hypothesis decreases the acceptability judgements.
The case of (11) can be seen as small-scale generalization. The use of abduction allows generalization on the basis of a small number of sufficiently similar cases. A new predicate is introduced which is abductively explained by the cases in question. There is no need for straightforward semantic criteria for this relation which are sometimes required under the lexical rule approach, cf. Briscoe & Copestake (1996) . This is especially useful in the case of (12): the generalization exploits a property of easily squashable juicy plants which is nameworthy because it is very salient in a small, but very important set of contexts. And lastly, exotic plants are not nameworthy origin properties of exotic fruit, presumably because they are exotic.
In the case of animal-to-meat sense extension in Russian, the domain of the morphological rule derivation can be easily restricted to animals which are sold as meat, in portions. The interaction between the two rules, the morphologically marked derivation rule and the sense extension, is the subject of the next section.
BLOCKING AND DEBLOCKING
Presumably these resources must be assessed from the viewpoint on the interlocutors, i.e. a) from the point of view of the listener: could the speaker intend to name something which does not have a specific name with required properties with the help of this device? and b) from the point of view of the speaker: can the listener plausibly find the hypothesis? These are pragmatic constraints, since their justification lies in the fact that there is a primary interpretation of a word, and the laws of successful communication are known to the interlocutors.
On the one hand, the listener's constraint would give one part of an account of blocking and deblocking. In (6), the use violates the assumption that there is no appropriate specific name, so the reference shift seems unmotivated. In (7) this shift is justified, since an additional characteristic can be hypothesized, distinguishing the two words. The mechanism is in each case based on something like Gricean Maxims yielding discourse implicatures , probably because more specific explanations are more informative. For this explication to go through the explanation via a name should be relatively more specific according to the specificity of explanations criterion. The definition of specificity (7) will be shown below to be applicable in this case.
On the other hand there should be a general mechanism to compute the plausibility of some interpretation relative to others which reflects the effort. Computing plausibility of an interpretation can use different degrees of assumption, e.g. how much inference using world knowledge this computation involves. The extreme case is probably the interpretation of unknown words. If e.g. the context of interpretation strongly suggests the meat-interpretation of an unknown word, then the constraints of the rule (23) can be used as a default characterisation of the aspect relation associated with the hypothesis animaltomeat. Thus, if somebody does not know what a badger is, s/he still can infer that it is an animal, and the edible part of its stuff is meant, though it is impossible to say which part it is; delicacy, ham, and eaten bias the explanation towards the edible parts. The bias could be accounted for using something like the coherence measure of Ng & Mooney (1990) .
To return to the account of explanation interaction in terms of Gricean maxims. One strategy of the listener is to assume that the speaker is as informative, as necessary and possible. In other words, s/he is trying to be as specific, as possible in the sense of Def. 6 of the specificity of solutions. The solutions in case of the name vs. extended sense possibilities are solutions to the choice of words. Given that this is known to the speaker, s/he would normally act this way. Acting contrary to it should be justifiable, i.e. explainable in its own right
In (6), the use violates the assumption that there is no specific name with appropriate properties, and there is no evident justification. In (7) this use is justified, since an additional characteristics of the object referred to can be computed on the basis of the contextual information: pig is intended to refer to generally not edible parts of pig, which are in the sausages. So the use of pig has a somewhat different explanation, than in the normal case. This use is justified from the point of view of Throat. The listener is invited to drop the constraint on edibility or to expand this notion: an invitation not understood by the customers of Throat, as a rule-to their disadvantage.
This account employs the definition of specificity. To show that Def. 6 is applicable in this case, we must compare two solutions to the choice problem. If the solution with the name turns out to be more specific, the definition (7) is applicable. But since the problem of word choice is not quite the problem of explanation choice, we should compare the resources of explanation in general, i.e. explanation schemata and not their instances.
Let (26) be the lexical entry for pork, and (27) the lexical entry for pig.
Suppose our relevant conceptual knowledge is represented in (28), Le. pigmeat is the meat a pig consists of, and it is a nameworthy aspect of pig, that it consists of meat (meat abbreviates edible stuff here). 
&-<(count(Y))&,edible(Y)&consistsof(X, Y) t
We have to show that the solution (31) is less general than the solution (32).
To check this assume that the discourse referent u is provided in the choice context choice. Consider the case where the choice context contains only the grammatical information that u is a discourse referent discoursereferent(u), and we know nothing about its identity. In this case both the solution (31) and (32) Consider now the example of this sense extension in Russian. A number of people suggested that morphologically marked semantics-changing derivation rules do not really differ from sense extension rules. They can thus be compared for specificity. The restriction of the sense extension rule to the holistic meaning is easily explainable if assumptions made to satisfy Gricean maxims can be conventionalized. Since the derivation rule is restricted to portion-wise sold animals, solutions using it would have been more specific than those using sense extension. The sense extension rule must aquire an additional condition, to be used nevertheless. The contrary to the restriction is the simplest conventionalizable addition, in a sense. For small animals the additional restriction is often not distinguishable from the holistic version; hence there is no violation of the maxims if both rules are used.
This account of rule deblocking refers to pragmatic inferences which may be ad hoc, for single words, or conventionalized fora class of words. But it is not applicable in a straightforward way to syntactic rules because of that. Specificity ranking can be defined on different kinds of rules. Inasmuch as such ranking is used in syntax, the similarity is very interesting and suggestive, and may be a manifestation of some deeper informationprocessing property of human intelligence, but the solutions to the problems of interpretation should not be automatically transferred to syntax, contrary to what I think is the position of Briscoe et al. (1995) . In particular, the morphological phenomenon when different tense-formation rules (e.g. dreamed/dreamt) coexist is not deblocking in the sense explicated here, since deblocking involves pragmatic inferences extending some attributes of a concept, as the discussion of (7) indicated, and is not available in the syntax.
Another feature of the account is that it presupposes contextual variation of concepts. Principles of such conceptual modification in a context are postulated by psychologists, but are not very clear (Barsalou 1992 reports on such effects).
A COMPARISON OF SOME RULE PROPERTIES UNDER THE TWO APPROACHES
A short comparison of the two approaches is now in order. Though the paper is largely programmatic, and merely sketches a formalization of the notion of a transfer function of Nunberg (1979) in the context of an abductive theory of natural language interpretation, there are two points clearly relevant to the proposal which should be discussed, however briefly, Le. contextual and language-particular licensing of the transfer. I will not be able to provide a theoretical contribution to these problems and have to restrict myself to some remarks. Since any aspect of a concept is in principle available as a source of a hypotheses space extension for rule generation, but not all potential extensions are observed in every language, and if they are then not in all contexts, such extensions must be licensed by some contextually relevant and language-relevant factors.
As far as language-particular preferences for sense extensions are concerned, the position of Nunberg seems to be adequate: cultural salience can lead to a sense extension rule. Unfortunately, no experiment in rule generation is possible here, since sense extension rules are learned when learning a language, and not created anew. Once the rule is highly conventionalized, it can be placed in the lexicon in the sense of being more readily accessible. The objection of Lascarides & Copestake (1998) that a non-trivial interface is required between the sort of formalism necessary to implement open-end inference of the kind proposed here and the syntactic representation is based on the assumption that some reasoning takes place in the lexicon, and it is better to make it easier. Programmatically, Poole systems and the context theory can achieve exactly this, limiting the depth of abduction.
Contextual dependence of a rule is another important matter. The use of context is limited under the lexicon rule approach to overriding the default information. Arguably, there is a better use, for which the abductive pragmatic approach is better suited. Consider the case of juice strains in (12). It could be assumed that all the aspects of a concept have logically equal chances either to be an interpretation for the sfortn or not to be, taken in isolation, but acquire different preferences depending on the interpretation context. The rating of a hypothesis in this context should depend on its salience there. If some interpretation hypotheses provide minimal explanations of an observation in the interpretation context, they should become more salient Thus, in the context of washing the juice stain interpretation of strawberry should be very salient. Then the corresponding rule will have a high probability of being chosen. The question is how to measure salience to achieve the kind of reasoning described. Intuitively, the interpretation becomes more likely because it explains part of the context. If you wash your trousers, this might be related to the stain, though other explanations are possible. Suppose we consider the salience of the stain hypothesis to be proportionate to a probability estimate of washing the trousers as a result of a stain on them. The new conditional probability of the hypothesis might be taken to reflect its chances of entering into an explanation of the word strawberry (its interpretation). But if its salience is only proportionate to the probability, it is actually a likelihood function (Edwards 1992) . Thus, there are two roads to compute the saliences of the hypotheses in the context either to treat them as probabilities directly, or to take their negative logarithms (log-likelihood) and treat them as cost assignments.
Probabilistic abduction proposed in Poole (1993) is a way to compute the conditional probabilities of hypotheses in a given context Cost-based abduction with probabilistic cost semantics proposed by Charniak & Shimony (1994) could implement the log-likelihood-based version, although a flexible reassignment of costs in a context is needed.
Lexicon rules can easily accommodate all kinds of syntactic and morphological effects accompanying sense extension. It is then possible to claim basic similarity of sense extensions and derivation. This is not a problem for the pragmatic rules, either, since rules can occur in lexical, entries of affixes.
Blocking and deblocking can be modelled under both approaches, but the interpretation of deblocked items can be naturally handled under the pragmatic rules approach, whereas Briscoe & Copestake (1996) , where a frequency-of-occurrence based account of blocking is proposed, reserve the problem of extra implicatures of the use of the blocked form and the generation of this form itself to the interface of pragmatics. Briscoe & Copestake (1996) also propose the use of statistic data to grade the rules relative to each lexical entry in the domain and to use the statistic information to guide the rule application. While this is of great potential interest for computational linguistics, this approach does not cover contextual dependence of the rules discussed above.
Another recent attempt to integrate probabilities, pragmatics, and a lexicon which is screened off from pragmatics is Copestake & Lascarides (1997) . But the approach propose there still offers no possibility to assign different probabilities to senses in different contexts. NOTES 1 Nunberg & Zaenen (1992) appeal to Gricean maxims to justify their opinion that a specific description is to be preferred to a vague one 'where no ulterior motives intrude'. They do not specify how these motives are figured out and taken into account by the listener. 2 Though cultural salience is a vague notion, it is fairly clear in prototypical cases. If these cases serve as a basis of a generalization, the pragmatic approach allows for predictions about new nouns, Le. names of unknown birds, new loans, etc. are going to be treated in one way or another depending on how well they fit the generalization. 3 The example is based on the hypothesis that this is the direction of the rule application. Some evidence for the hypothesis are the forms like lemon-tree in English or Apfelbaum (apple-tree) in German. This is also the direction adopted in ; Apresjan assumes the reverse. 4 The term is used by Nunberg & Zaenen (1992) to describe specifications of a general relation in a context depending on the world knowledge. 5 Note that the hypotheses in II are not statements about the real world! but assumptions about what can be a possible description of the world. 6 A reviewer noted that the default logic in Poole systems is insufficient. Indeed the relation of sceptical default consequence in Poole systems with constraints is equivalent to the prerequisite-free default logic of Reiter, cf. Reiter (1980), Dix (1992) . However, the computed relation is here not that of sceptical default consequence, but of explanation. The objection does not apply. Pros and cons of abductive explanation vs. default logic should be evaluated in each application case. 7 See Chaffin (1992) for the polysemy of the part of relation.
8 In an attempt to provide an interpretation for the notoriously difficult domain of compounds Copestake & Lascarides (1997) suggest that interpreting a compound should be controlled by the associated probabilities. They register a restricted number of relations interpreting a compound in the lexicon as interpretation schema. These are ordered by a specificity hierarchy. If no specific interpretation is possible, the most general relation is considered and treated as an anaphor to be resolved pragmatically from the context. The choice between several possible compatible readings is guided by the principle that words are assigned the most probable sense that produces a well-defined discourse update. The distinctive feature of the proposal is the method of computing probabilities. The probability of a sense of a word depends on the frequency of this sense in the corpus used to compute the frequency distributions. The interpretation schemata defining the senses of the compounds are assigned weights which reflect their productivity. For a potential compound which does not occur in the corpus the probabilities of the senses will be proportional to the productivity rankings. If a compound is observed in the corpus, the probabilities of its senses are computed via their frequency in the corpus, with a residual probability distributed between those senses, which are not observed, again in proportion to the productivity rankings. Thus, there is no way to take into account the influences of the context on the probability of a reading. Hence if two readings are compatible, it is invariably the more frequent that will be chosen. The closest we can get to reflecting the contextual influence is to index probabilities by the type of corpus used to compute them.
